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World leaders, CEOs, and academics have suggested that a 
revolution in artificial intelligence is upon us. Are they right, and 
what will advances in artificial intelligence mean for international 
competition and the balance of power? This article evaluates how 
developments in artificial intelligence (AI) — advanced, narrow 
applications in particular — are poised to influence military 
power and international politics. It describes how AI more closely 
resembles “enabling” technologies such as the combustion 
engine or electricity than a specific weapon. AI’s still-emerging 
developments make it harder to assess than many technological 
changes, especially since many of the organizational decisions 
about the adoption and uses of new technology that generally 
shape the impact of that technology are in their infancy. The article 
then explores the possibility that key drivers of AI development 
in the private sector could cause the rapid diffusion of military 
applications of AI, limiting first-mover advantages for innovators. 
Alternatively, given uncertainty about the technological trajectory 
of AI, it is also possible that military uses of AI will be harder 
to develop based on private-sector AI technologies than many 
expect, generating more potential first-mover advantages for 
existing powers such as China and the United States, as well as 
larger consequences for relative power if a country fails to adapt. 
Finally, the article discusses the extent to which U.S. military 




In early September 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin brought artificial intelligence from the labs of Silicon Valley, academia, and the basement of the Pentagon to 
the forefront of international politics. “Artificial 
intelligence is the future, not only for Russia, but 
for all humankind,” he said. “It comes with colossal 
opportunities, but also threats that are difficult to 
predict. Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere 
will become the ruler of the world.”1
Putin’s remarks reflect a belief, growing in sectors 
and regions across the world, that advances in 
artificial intelligence will be critical for the future 
— in areas as varied as work, society, and military 
power. Artificial intelligence is a critical element of 
what Klaus Schwab, head of the World Economic 
Forum, calls the Fourth Industrial Revolution.2 Eric 
Schmidt, the former CEO of Google, argues that 
artificial intelligence is so important to the future 
of power that the United States needs a national 
strategy on artificial intelligence, just as it had one 
for the development of space technology during 
the Cold War.3 Elon Musk, the head of Tesla and 
SpaceX, has even said that growth in artificial 
intelligence technology, left unchecked, could 
risk sparking World War III.4 These statements 
suggest that artificial intelligence will have a large 
and potentially deterministic influence on global 
politics and the balance of power.5 
Whether artificial intelligence has revolutionary 
consequences or merely incremental effects, it 
is critical to grasp how and why it could matter 
in the national security arena. Despite a wave of 
articles about artificial intelligence in the popular 
press and trade journals, there has been less in the 
way of systematic academic work on the national 
security consequences of such developments. This 
1  James Vincent, “Putin Says the Nation That Leads in AI ‘Will Be the Ruler of the World,’” Verge, Sept. 4, 2017, https://www.theverge.
com/2017/9/4/16251226/russia-ai-putin-rule-the-world.
2  Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution (New York: Crown Business, 2017).
3  Colin Clark, “Our Artificial Intelligence ‘Sputnik Moment’ Is Now: Eric Schmidt & Bob Work,” Breaking Defense, Nov. 1, 2017, https://
breakingdefense.com/2017/2011/our-artificial-intelligence-sputnik-moment-is-now-eric-schmidt-bob-work/.
4  Seth Fiegerman, “Elon Musk Predicts World War III,” CNN, Sept. 4, 2017, http://money.cnn.com/2017/09/04/technology/culture/elon-musk-ai-
world-war/index.html.
5  On technological determinism, see Merritt R. Smith and Leo Marx, Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994).
6  William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
7  Jeremiah E. Dittmar, “Information Technology and Economic Change: The Impact of the Printing Press,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 126, no. 
3 (August 2011): 1133-1172, https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjr035.
8  Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).
9  In the military dimension, see Michael C. Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010). For a critique of technology-focused thinking about the future of war, see Paul K. Van Riper and 
Frank G. Hoffman, “Pursuing the Real Revolution in Military Affairs: Exploiting Knowledge-Based Warfare,” National Security Studies Quarterly 4, no. 
3 (1998): 4; H.R. McMaster, “Continuity and Change: The Army Operating Concept and Clear Thinking About Future War,” Military Review (2015), 
https://www.westpoint.edu/scusa/SiteAssets/SitePages/Keynote Speakers/Continuity and Change by LTG McMaster.pdf.
10  Clark G. Reynolds, The Fast Carriers; The Forging of an Air Navy, 1st ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968); Mark R. Peattie, Sunburst: The Rise of 
Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909-1941 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001).
article attempts to fill that gap by examining the 
effects on national security of narrow artificial 
intelligence, or systems designed to do deliberately 
constrained tasks, such as the Jeopardy-playing 
version of IBM’s Watson or AlphaGo, designed to 
play the board game Go. Specifically, it assesses 
the issues AI stands to raise for the balance of 
power and international competition through the 
lens of academic research on military innovation, 
technological change, and international politics.
Popular writing on AI tends to focus almost 
exclusively on technology development. 
Technology has played a vital role in shaping global 
politics throughout history.6 Hundreds of years ago, 
technologies such as the printing press allowed 
the written word to flourish. These set the stage 
for new forms of political protest and activity.7 In 
the 20th century, nuclear weapons significantly 
increased the destructive capabilities of numerous 
countries.8
Yet the relative impact of technological change 
often depends as much or more on how people, 
organizations, and societies adopt and utilize 
technologies as it does on the raw characteristics 
of the technology.9 Consider the aircraft carrier, 
which the British Navy invented in 1918. As the best 
in the world at using battleships, the Royal Navy 
initially imagined the utility of aircraft carriers as 
providing airplanes to serve as spotters for the 
battleship. The Japanese and U.S. navies, however, 
innovated by using the aircraft carrier as a mobile 
airfield, fundamentally transforming naval warfare 
in the 20th century.10 Or, consider the printing 
press again: Its role in accelerating nationalist 
political movements depended on the incentives 
that originally motivated those movements and the 
movements’ ability to take advantage of the new 
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technology’s capability to spread information.11
What role will artificial intelligence play? In many 
ways it is too soon to tell, given uncertainty about 
the development of the technology. But AI seems 
much more akin to the internal combustion engine 
or electricity than a weapon. It is an enabler, a 
general-purpose technology with a multitude of 
applications. That makes AI different from, and 
broader than, a missile, a submarine, or a tank.
Advances in narrow AI could create 
challenges as well as opportunities 
for governments and military 
organizations. For example, narrow AI 
applications such as image recognition 
would help those militaries that are 
already wealthy and powerful and that 
can afford to keep up. It is harder to predict 
how AI applications could affect the heart of 
military organizations, influencing planning 
as well as questions of recruiting, retention, 
and force structure. What happens as militaries 
increasingly need soldiers who have training 
in coding and who understand how algorithms 
work? Or if swarming, uninhabited systems make 
large conventional military platforms seem costly 
and obsolete? Leading militaries often struggle in 
the face of organizationally disruptive innovations 
because it is hard to make the bureaucratic case for 
change when a military perceives itself as already 
leading. 
What countries benefit from AI will depend in 
part on where militarily-relevant innovations come 
from. Non-military institutions, such as private 
companies and academic departments, are pushing 
the boundaries of what is possible in the realm of 
artificial intelligence. While some AI and robotics 
companies, such as Boston Dynamics, receive 
military research and development funding, others, 
such as DeepMind, do not, and actively reject 
engaging with military organizations.12 Unlike 
stealth technology, which has a fundamentally 
military purpose, artificial intelligence has uses as 
varied as shopping, agriculture, and stock trading. 
If commercially-driven AI continues to fuel 
innovation, and the types of algorithms militaries 
might one day use are closely related to civilian 
applications, advances in AI are likely to diffuse 
more rapidly to militaries around the world. 
AI competition could feature actors across the 
globe developing AI capabilities, much like late-
19th-century competition in steel and chemicals. 
11  Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962).
12  Clemency Burton-Hill, “The Superhero of Artificial Intelligence: Can This Genius Keep It in Check?” Guardian, Feb. 16, 2016, https://www.
theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/16/demis-hassabis-artificial-intelligence-deepmind-alphago.
13  Katja Grace et al., “When Will AI Exceed Human Performance? Evidence from AI Experts,” arXiv (May 2017), https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.08807.
The potential for diffusion would make it more 
difficult to maintain “first-mover advantages” in 
applications of narrow AI. This could change the 
balance of power, narrowing the gap in military 
capabilities not only between the United States 
and China but between others as well.
Experts disagree about the potential trajectory 
of the technology, however, which means that 
forecasts of the consequences of AI developments 
for the international security environment are 
necessarily tentative.13 While the basic science 
underlying AI is applicable to both civilian and 
military purposes, it is plausible that the most 
important specific military uses of AI will not 
be dual use. Technological advances that are 
more exclusively based in military research are 
generally harder to mimic. It follows that military 
applications of AI based more exclusively in 
defense research will then generate larger first-
mover advantages for early adopters. Moreover, 
if the computational power necessary to generate 
new, powerful algorithms prices out all but the 
wealthiest companies and countries, higher-end AI 
capabilities could help the rich get richer from a 
balance-of-power perspective. On the other hand, if 
leading militaries fail to effectively incorporate AI, 
the potential for disruption would also be larger.
This article defines artificial intelligence and 
examines what kind of technology AI is. It then 
turns to key questions and assumptions about 
the trajectory of narrow AI development that 
will influence potential adoption requirements 
for military applications of AI, a factor critical to 
shaping AI’s influence on the balance of power. 
The paper then assesses how narrow artificial 
intelligence will affect the balance of power in a 
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world where dual-use AI has great military relevance 
and diffuses rapidly as well as a scenario in which 
military AI developments are more “excludable,” 
limiting diffusion and generating more first-mover 
advantages. 
How all this will play out over the next decade or 
more is unclear. Already, China, Russia, and others 
are investing significantly in AI to increase their 
relative military capabilities with an eye toward 
reshaping the balance of power. As the field of 
AI matures, and more implementations become 
plausible in arenas such as logistics, personnel, and 
even deployable units, countries will need to figure 
out how to use AI in practical ways that improve 
their ability to generate military power. The risk for 
the United States in terms of balance of power thus 
lies in taking its military superiority for granted 
and ending up like Great Britain’s Royal Navy with 
the aircraft carrier in the mid-20th century — a 
technological innovator that is surpassed when it 
comes to organizational adoption and use of the 
technology.
What Is Artificial Intelligence?
What is artificial intelligence? There is no broad 
consensus on the specific meanings of terms such 
as artificial intelligence, autonomy, and automation. 
For the purposes of this article, artificial intelligence 
refers to the use of computers to simulate the 
behavior of humans that requires intelligence.14 Put 
another way, AI can be thought of as the ability of an 
artificial agent to achieve goals in a “wide range of 
environments.”15 A system with artificial intelligence 
14  This is based on the Russell and Norvig definition that artificial intelligence is about the construction of artificial rational agents that can 
perceive and act. See Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig, Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2009). 
Also see Calum McClelland, “The Difference Between Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and Deep Learning,” Medium, Dec. 4, 2017, https://
medium.com/iotforall/the-difference-between-artificial-intelligence-machine-learning-and-deep-learning-3aa67bff5991. 
15  Shane Legg and Marcus Hutter, “Universal Intelligence: A Definition of Machine Intelligence,” arXiv, (December 2007): 12, https://arxiv.org/
abs/0712.3329.
16  Michael C. Horowitz, “Military Robotics, Autonomous Systems, and the Future of Military Effectiveness,” in The Sword’s Other Edge: Tradeoffs in 
the Pursuit of Military Effectiveness, ed. Dan Reiter (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
17  Matt Simon, “Watch Boston Dynamics’ SpotMini Robot Open a Door,” Wired, Feb. 12, 2018,  https://www.wired.com/story/watch-boston-
dynamics-spotmini-robot-open-a-door/.
18  This is based on the discussion in Paul Scharre and Michael C. Horowitz, “An Introduction to Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Center for a New 
American Security working paper (February 2015): 5, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/an-introduction-to-autonomy-in-weapon-systems.
19  Michael C. Horowitz, Paul Scharre, and Alex Velez-Green, “A Stable Nuclear Future? The Impact of Automation, Autonomy, and Artificial 
Intelligence” (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2017).
20  Scharre and Horowitz, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” 6.
21  Murray Campbell, A. Joseph Hoane Jr., and Feng-hsiung Hsu, “Deep Blue,” Artificial Intelligence 134, no. 1-2 (2002): 57-83, https://doi.
org/10.1016/S0004-3702(01)00129-1.
22  Ryszard S. Michalski, Jaime G. Carbonell, and Tom M. Mitchell, eds., Machine Learning: An Artificial Intelligence Approach (New York: Springer, 
2013); Allen Newell and Herbert Alexander Simon, Human Problem Solving (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1972).
23  Robert D. Hof, “Deep Learning,” MIT Technology Review (2013), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/513696/deep-learning/; Anh Nguyen, 
Jason Yosinski, and Jeff Clune, “Deep Neural Networks Are Easily Fooled: High Confidence Predictions for Unrecognizable Images” (Paper 
presented at the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers conference on computer vision and pattern recognition, 2015), https://arxiv.org/
abs/1412.1897.
is distinct from a robot or robotic system, which can 
be remotely piloted or autonomous.16 For example, 
the Boston Dynamics SpotMini, which can open a 
door, is remotely piloted by a human operator so 
would not qualify as AI.17 Automatic systems, such 
as a toaster in the civilian world or, to use a military 
example, an explosive triggered by a tripwire, 
respond mechanistically to environmental inputs.18 
Automated systems, by contrast, operate based on 
multiple pre-programmed logic steps as opposed to 
the simplicity of a tripwire.19 Autonomous systems 
have more latitude and are programmed, within 
constraints, to achieve goals, optimizing along a set 
of parameters.20
There are two main approaches to AI, broadly 
conceived. The first is symbolic artificial intelligence 
— the creation of expert systems and production 
rules to allow a machine to deduce behavioral 
pathways. IBM’s Deep Blue, which defeated Garry 
Kasparov in chess in 1997, used a symbolic approach.21 
Computational, or connectionist, approaches to 
artificial intelligence, in contrast, typically attempt 
to allow for problem recognition and action by 
machines through calculations rather than symbolic 
representation.22 Machine learning represents a key 
computational approach to artificial intelligence. 
Multiple computational techniques are used to create 
machine-learning algorithms, including Bayesian 
networks, decision trees, and deep learning. Deep 
learning, now popularly associated with artificial 
intelligence, is a technique that harnesses neural 
networks to train algorithms to do specified tasks, 
such as image recognition.23 Some researchers are 
pursuing hybrid approaches that integrate both 
symbolic and computational approaches to AI. The 
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hope behind hybrid approaches is that creating 
common languages will enable algorithms that 
can employ multiple pathways to learn how to do 
particular tasks, making them more effective.24
For the purposes of this article, the specific 
methods of AI that generate particular capabilities 
are less critical than understanding the general 
trajectory of the technology. In many cases, it is 
too soon to tell which methods will generate which 
capabilities.
AI Is an Enabler, Not a Weapon
The impact of the invention of a new technology 
depends, in part, on its potential basic uses.25 Some 
communication technologies, such as the telegraph 
or telephone, were designed to more rapidly 
connect people in different locations. Munition 
technologies, such as missiles and bullets, are 
designed to inflict damage on a target. Railroads 
are a transportation technology, as is a bicycle. 
These broad categories of technologies have 
subcomponents that draw on various technologies 
themselves. For example, more than 300,000 parts 
go into an F-35.26 Another category might then be 
called “enabling technologies,” which are designed 
not specifically for a single purpose like the 
examples above but, instead, are general-purpose, 
with broad applications across many other types of 
technologies. Electricity is an enabling technology.
So what kind of technology is artificial intelligence? 
While the rhetoric of the “Third Offset”27 and other 
discussions in the defense community sometimes 
make artificial intelligence seem like a munition, 
AI is actually the ultimate enabler. AI can be part 
of many specific technologies, analogous to the 
24  Antonio Lieto, Antonio Chella, and Marcello Frixione, “Conceptual Spaces for Cognitive Architectures: A Lingua Franca for Different Levels of 
Representation,” Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architectures 19 (January 2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bica.2016.10.005.
25  Calestous Juma, Innovation and Its Enemies: Why People Resist New Technologies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
26  Lockheed Martin, “Building the F-35: Combining Teamwork and Technology,” accessed May 8, 2018, https://www.f35.com/about/life-cycle/
production.
27  The “Third Offset” was a Department of Defense initiative led by Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work that was designed to preserve 
U.S. military superiority through exploiting a generation of emerging technologies. Robert O. Work, Deputy Secretary of Defense Remarks to the 
Association of the U.S. Army Annual Convention, Oct. 4, 2016, https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/974075/remarks-
to-the-association-of-the-us-army-annual-convention/.
28  Walter Frick, “Why AI Can’t Write This Article (Yet),” Harvard Business Review, July 24, 2017, https://hbr.org/cover-story/2017/07/the-
business-of-artificial-intelligence#/2017/07/why-ai-cant-write-this-article-yet.
29  Andrew Ng, “Artificial Intelligence Is the New Electricity,” Medium, April 28, 2017, https://medium.com/@Synced/artificial-intelligence-is-the-
new-electricity-andrew-ng-cc132ea6264.
30  Mick Ryan, “Building a Future: Integrated Human-Machine Military Organization,” Strategy Bridge, Dec. 11, 2017, https://thestrategybridge.org/
the-bridge/2017/12/11/building-a-future-integrated-human-machine-military-organization; Paul Scharre, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and 
the Future of War (New York: W.W. Norton, 2018). 
31  Gregory C. Allen, “Project Maven Brings AI to the Fight Against ISIS,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Dec. 21, 2017, https://thebulletin.org/
project-maven-brings-ai-fight-against-isis11374.
32  Note that this illustrates the importance of data in training algorithms. While there is some promise to synthetic data for training algorithms, 
there is not currently a substitute for data based on real-world experience. Thus, access to large quantities of useful data will be critical to 
designing successful algorithms in particular arenas. For an example of basic defense research on using AI to increase situational awareness, see 
Heather Roff, “COMPASS: A new AI-driven situational awareness tool for the Pentagon?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 10, 2018, https://
thebulletin.org/compass-new-ai-driven-situational-awareness-tool-pentagon11816. 
internal combustion engine as well as electricity.28 
Andrew Ng of Stanford University argues that, like 
the invention of electricity, AI could enable specific 
technologies in fields as diverse as agriculture, 
manufacturing, and health care.29 
Artificial intelligence can operate in several 
dimensions. First, it can be used to direct physical 
objects, such as robotic systems, to act without 
human supervision. Whether in tanks, planes, or 
ships, AI can help reduce the need to use humans, 
even remotely, or as part of human-machine 
teams.30 Swarm techniques, for example, generally 
involve the creation of supervised algorithms that 
direct platforms such as drones. Second, artificial 
intelligence can assist in processing and interpreting 
information. Image-recognition algorithms can be 
used for tagging vacation photos and identifying 
products in stores as well as in Project Maven, a U.S. 
military program that seeks to develop algorithms 
to automate the process of analyzing video feeds 
captured by drones.31 While the applications in 
each case are different, the underlying algorithmic 
task — rapid image identification and tagging — is 
consistent. Third, overlapping narrow AI systems 
could be used for new forms of command and 
control — operational systems, including battle 
management, that analyze large sets of data and 
make forecasts to direct human action — or action 
by algorithms.32
What Type of Artificial Intelligence?
It is useful to think about the degree of artificial 
intelligence as a continuum. On one end are narrow 
AI applications such as AlphaGo, able to beat the 
best human Go players in the world. These are 
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machine-learning algorithms designed to do one 
specific task, with no prospect of doing anything 
beyond that task. One can imagine narrow AI as 
relatively advanced forms of autonomous systems, 
or machines that, once activated, are designed to 
complete specific tasks or functions.33
On the other end of the spectrum is a “super-
intelligent” artificial general intelligence. This kind 
of AI would consist of an algorithm, or series of 
algorithms, that could do not only narrow tasks 
but also could functionally think for itself and 
design solutions to a broader class of problems. 
Describing an extreme version of this, Nick Bostrom 
writes about the risk of a superintelligent AI that 
could plausibly take over the world and perhaps 
even decide to eliminate humans as an inadvertent 
consequence of its programming.34 In the middle 
of this spectrum, though perhaps leaning toward 
artificial general intelligence, is “transformative 
AI,” or AI that can go beyond a narrow task such 
as playing a video game but falls short of achieving 
superintelligence.35
This article focuses on the potential effect that 
narrow applications of artificial intelligence could 
have on the balance of power and international 
competition. Among current AI technologies and 
advances, narrow applications are most likely to 
affect militaries — and with them the balance of 
power — over the next two decades. Moreover, even 
experts disagree about whether artificial general 
intelligence of the type that could outpace human 
capabilities will emerge in the short to medium 
term or whether it is still hundreds of years away. 
AI experts also disagree about the overall trajectory 
of advances in AI.36 Surveys have found that only 50 
percent of AI researchers believe that an AI system 
will be capable of writing a best-selling book by 
2049. About 75 percent of AI researchers thought 
it could be 2090 before an AI system could write a 
best-selling book. That even highly trained experts 
disagree about these development issues illustrates 
a high degree of uncertainty in the field.
Given these questions about which AI technologies 
33  Scharre and Horowitz, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” 5.
34  Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
35  Allan Dafoe, “Governing the AI Revolution: The Research Landscape” (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2018), https://machine-learning-and-
security.github.io/slides/Allan-Dafoe-NIPS-s.pdf.
36  Grace et al., “When Will AI Exceed Human Performance?”
37  McNeill, The Pursuit of Power.
38  David A. Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies,” World Politics 31, no. 2 (January 1979): 161-194, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2009941; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
39  Scharre and Horowitz, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems.”
40  Missy L. Cummings, “Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare,” Chatham House, January 2017, https://www.chathamhouse.org/
publication/artificial-intelligence-and-future-warfare.
41  Napoleonic warfare, or levée en masse, is an example of a military innovation not considered tied to technological innovations.
will be developed, this article focuses on the 
capabilities that are most likely to emerge in the 
next generation.
Technology and the Balance of Power
Emerging technologies primarily shape the 
balance of power through military and economic 
means.37 Technologies can directly influence 
countries’ abilities to fight and win wars. They 
can also indirectly affect the balance of power by 
impacting a country’s economic power. After all, 
countries cannot maintain military superiority over 
the medium to long term without an underlying 
economic basis for that power.38 Recall the decline 
of the Ottoman Empire or Imperial China.
However, it is not yet clear how the invention of 
specific AI applications will translate into military 
power. Despite continuing investment, efforts to 
integrate AI technologies into militaries have been 
limited.39 Project Maven is the first activity of an 
“Algorithmic Warfare” initiative in the U.S. military 
designed to harness the potential of AI and translate 
it into usable military capabilities. Still, many 
investments in the United States and elsewhere are 
in early stages. As Missy L. Cummings writes: 
Autonomous ground vehicles such as tanks 
and transport vehicles are in development 
worldwide, as are autonomous underwater 
vehicles. In almost all cases, however, the 
agencies developing these technologies are 
struggling to make the leap from development 
to operational implementation.40 
It is important to distinguish these potential 
technological innovations from military 
innovations. While military innovations are often 
linked to changes in technology,41 it is not always the 
case. Military innovations are significant changes 
in organizational behavior and ways that a military 
fights that are designed to increase its ability to 
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effectively translate capabilities into power.42 The 
use of aircraft carriers as mobile airfields by the 
United States and Japan is a prototypical example. 
While AI could potentially enable a number of 
military innovations, it is not a military innovation 
itself, and no applications of AI have been used in 
ways that would count as a military innovation at 
this point. 
Because AI research and technology are still in 
their early stages, usage of AI in warfare is not 
even yet analogous to the first use of the tank in 
World War I, let alone effective use of combined 
arms warfare by the Germans in World War II (the 
military innovation now known as blitzkrieg). This 
limits analyses about how narrow AI might one 
day affect the balance of power and international 
politics. Most research on technology and 
international politics focuses on specific, mature 
technologies, such as nuclear weapons, or on 
military innovations.43 Since AI is at an early stage, 
examining it requires adapting existing theories 
about military technology and military innovation.44
My adoption capacity theory provides insight 
into how developments in AI will affect the balance 
of power.45 This theory argues that the relative 
financial and organizational requirements for 
adopting a military innovation influence the rate 
of diffusion of that innovation and its impact on 
the balance of power. Financial considerations 
include calculating the unit costs of the hardware 
involved and determining whether the underlying 
capability is based on commercial or militarily-
exclusive technology. Other considerations 
include assessing the extent to which adopting 
42  On military innovation in general, see Adam Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation Studies,” Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 5 (2006): 
905-934, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390600901067.
43  Bernard Brodie et al., eds., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946); Stephen P. Rosen, Winning 
the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: 
France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984).
44  Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine; Rosen, Winning the Next War; Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural 
Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the U.S., and Israel (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010); Theo Farrell, “World 
Culture and Military Power,” Security Studies 14, no. 3 (2005): 448-488, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410500323187; Emily O. Goldman and Leslie 
C. Eliason eds., The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).
45  Horowitz, Diffusion of Military Power, 10-11.
46  This relates to questions about the offense/defense implications of technology, though technology itself is rarely predictive. See Keir A. Lieber, 
War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics Over Technology (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).
47  Stephen D. Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).
the innovation requires disrupting the critical task 
of the military (i.e., what an organization views 
itself as attempting to achieve) or the status of key 
organizational elites (for example, fighter pilots in 
an air force). Given that adoption capacity theory 
focuses on major military innovations, however, 
it requires adaptation to be applied to artificial 
intelligence at present. 
To determine how technological changes will 
shape the balance of power, adoption capacity 
theory suggests that three questions must be 
answered. First, while technology itself is rarely, if 
ever, determinative, how might use of a technology 
influence the character of warfare? Consider the 
machine gun. When deployed asymmetrically, it 
proved useful for the offense. But in combination 
with barbed wire, when possessed symmetrically, 
this technological advance helped create the 
trench-warfare stalemate of World War I.46 More 
broadly, the Industrial Revolution and the shift in 
manufacturing to factories and mass production 
were behind the rifle’s evolution from a niche, craft 
weapon possessed by a small number of forces 
to a widely available capability. This 
change influenced the relative lethality 
of battles as well as how militaries 
organized themselves and developed 
tactics.47
Second, how might different actors 
implement a given technology or be 
bureaucratically constrained from 
implementation, and what possibilities 
for military innovation will that 
generate? This question is particularly relevant 
because the challenges of organizational adoption 
and implementation of a technological innovation 
are closely linked with effectiveness. Those 
challenges are critical to determining how an 
innovation will impact international politics. 
Decades of research demonstrates that the 
impact of technological change on global politics — 
whether it is change in economics, society at large, 
diplomacy, or military power — depends much 
more on how governments and organizations 
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make choices about the adoption and use of new 
capabilities than on the technologies themselves.48 
Scholarship on military innovation by Barry 
Posen, Stephen P. Rosen, and others shows that 
technological innovation alone rarely shapes the 
balance of power.49 Instead, it is how militaries use 
a technology that makes a difference.50 A military’s 
ability to employ a technology depends in part on 
the complexity of the technology, how difficult it 
is to use, and whether it operates in predictable 
and explainable ways. These factors influence 
the trust that senior military leaders have in the 
technology and whether they use it.51 Additionally, 
the more bureaucratically disruptive it is to adopt 
a technology, the more challenging it can be for 
older, more established organizations to do so — 
particularly if the organization is underinvested in 
research and development designed to integrate 
new technologies and ideas.52
Consider that every country in Europe in the 
mid-19th century had access to railroads, rifles, and 
the telegraph around the same time. But it was the 
Prussian military that first figured out how to exploit 
these technologies, in combination, to rapidly 
project power. After that, other militaries adapted 
their organizations to take similar advantage.53
The example of the British Navy and the aircraft 
carrier further illustrates how organizational 
processes determine the impact of technology 
on military power.54 As referenced above, despite 
having invented the aircraft carrier, the Royal Navy’s 
institutional commitment to the battleship meant 
that it initially saw the value of this new technology 
almost exclusively in its ability to facilitate the use 
48  This is not meant to endorse or reject the notion of technology as a social construction. On that point, see Trevor J. Pinch and Wiebe E. Bijker, 
“The Social Construction of Facts and Artefacts: Or How the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other,” 
Social Studies of Science 14, no. 3 (1984): 399-441, http://www.jstor.org/stable/285355. What is key is that it is in the context of organizational 
behavior that the impact of technological change becomes clearest.
49  Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine; Rosen, Winning the Next War; Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation.
50  Nuclear weapons are arguably an exception to this pattern, given their unique destructive power. But they may be the exception that proves 
the rule.
51  Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli, “Military-Technological Superiority: Systems Integration and the Challenges of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and 
Cyber-Espionage,” International Security (forthcoming).
52  Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1982); Horowitz, Diffusion of Military Power.
53  Dennis E. Showalter, Railroads and Rifles: Soldiers, Technology, and the Unification of Germany (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1975); Geoffrey L. 
Herrera and Thomas G. Mahnken, “Military Diffusion in Nineteenth-Century Europe: The Napoleonic and Prussian Military Systems,” in The Diffusion 
of Military Technology and Ideas, ed. Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).
54  Another example is the tank. Applied to AI and drones, see Ulrike E. Franke, “A European Approach to Military Drones and Artificial 
Intelligence,” European Council on Foreign Relations, June 23, 2017, http://www.ecfr.eu/article/essay_a_european_approach_to_military_drones_
and_artificial_intelligence. In general, see David E. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917–1945 (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1998).
55  Horowitz, Diffusion of Military Power.
56  Horowitz, Diffusion of Military Power.
57  Horowitz, Diffusion of Military Power.
58  See Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth 
Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); Horowitz, Diffusion of Military Power.
of airplanes to act as “spotters” for battleships. The 
United States and Japan, as rising naval powers with 
less invested in the importance of the battleship, 
thought more creatively about this innovation and 
realized that the aircraft carrier’s real value lay in 
the independent striking power it offered.55 Since 
battleships — and admirals with experience and 
comfort operating them — dominated the navies of 
many countries, thinking about the aircraft carrier 
as a mobile airfield required a difficult conceptual 
shift.56 
Even after it became clear that the optimal use of 
aircraft carriers was as a mobile airfield, adopting 
carrier warfare proved challenging. The Chinese 
navy has been working on carrier operations for 
two decades and is only just starting to build real 
competency. The Soviet Union attempted to adopt 
carrier warfare for decades and failed. Simply put, 
the systems integration tasks required to operate 
the ship, launch and recover airplanes from the 
ship, and coordinate with other naval assets are 
very difficult to execute.57 The larger the change 
within the organization required for a military to 
effectively utilize new technologies, the greater 
the bureaucratic challenges and, with them, the 
likelihood that powerful countries will not have 
the organizational capability to adopt. This is a 
key mechanism through which the balance of 
power can change.
Third, how will a new technology spread? The 
answer to this question will help determine 
relative first-mover advantages gained from 
adopting the technology.58 While Kenneth Waltz 
initially suggested that emulation of military 
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technologies happens quickly, subsequent research 
demonstrates that it is far more complicated.59 
The rate of diffusion matters: In the case of 
technologies that diffuse slowly, the country that 
first implements will have a sustainable edge 
over its competitors. But when other countries 
can rapidly adopt a new technology, the relative 
advantages of being first diminish.60
The diffusion of military technology occurs 
through multiple mechanisms, just like the diffusion 
of technologies in general.61 Adoption capacity 
theory suggests a few factors that will be key in 
influencing the diffusion of narrow AI. The first is 
the unit cost of creating AI systems. The greater 
the hardware and compute costs associated with 
creating militarily-relevant algorithms, the higher 
the barrier to entry will be. Alternatively, once 
the algorithms have been created, they become 
software and can more easily diffuse.
Moreover, technologies that have only military 
purposes tend to spread more slowly than 
technologies where commercial incentives drive 
their development. If a technology has only 
military uses — such as stealth technology — and 
it has a high unit cost and level of complexity, the 
number of actors who can emulate or mimic that 
technology is minimized.62 
On the other hand, technologies with commercial 
incentives for development generally spread much 
faster. In the 19th century, the railroad, used as 
a “military technology,” enabled rapid power 
projection and the massing of military forces 
to a greater degree than had previously been 
possible. Yet it was the commercial incentives for 
59  Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).
60  Marvin B. Lieberman and David B. Montgomery, “First-Mover Advantages,” Strategic Management Journal 9, no. 1 (1988): 41-58, https://doi.
org/10.1002/smj.4250090706; Marvin B. Lieberman and David B. Montgomery, “First-Mover (Dis)Advantages: Retrospective and Link with the 
Resource-Based View,” Strategic Management Journal 19, no. 12 (1998): 1111-1125, https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(1998120)19:12<1111::AID-
SMJ21>3.0.CO;2-W; Gerard J. Tellis and Peter N. Golder, Will and Vision: How Latecomers Grow to Dominate Markets (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
2002).
61  Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, 5th ed. (New York: Free Press, 2003). 
62  Horowitz, Diffusion of Military Power. For a recent argument about the complexity of stealth and the challenges of adoption, see Gilli and Gilli, 
“Military-Technological Superiority.”
63  Showalter, Railroads and Rifles; Geoffrey L. Herrera, Technology and International Transformation: The Railroad, the Atom Bomb, and the Politics 
of Technological Change (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2006).
64  Eric Schmidt, “Keynote Address at the Center for a New American Security Artificial Intelligence and Global Security Summit,” Center for a New 
American Security, Nov. 13, 2017, https://www.cnas.org/publications/transcript/eric-schmidt-keynote-address-at-the-center-for-a-new-american-
security-artificial-intelligence-and-global-security-summit.
65  John R. Allen and Amir Husain, “The Next Space Race Is Artificial Intelligence,” Foreign Policy, Nov. 3, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.
com/2017/2011/2003/the-next-space-race-is-artificial-intelligence-and-america-is-losing-to-china/.
66  Tom Simonite, “For Superpowers, Artificial Intelligence Fuels New Global Arms Race,” Wired, Sept. 8, 2017, https://www.wired.com/story/
for-superpowers-artificial-intelligence-fuels-new-global-arms-race/; Zachary Cohen, “US Risks Losing Artificial Intelligence Arms Race to China and 
Russia,” CNN, Nov. 29, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/29/politics/us-military-artificial-intelligence-russia-china/index.html; Julian E. Barnes 
and Josh Chin, “The New Arms Race in AI,” Wall Street Journal, Mar. 2, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-arms-race-in-ai-1520009261.
67  Graham Webster et al., “China’s Plan to ‘Lead’ in AI: Purpose, Prospects, and Problems,” New America Foundation, Aug. 1, 2017, https://www.
newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/blog/chinas-plan-lead-ai-purpose-prospects-and-problems/.
the fast shipping of goods that helped speed the 
construction of dense railroad networks around 
the world, making it difficult for countries to gain 
sustainable advantages in railroad capabilities.63 
The Impact of AI on the 
Balance of Power
If Eric Schmidt, Vladimir Putin, Elon Musk, 
and others are correct that AI is a competitive 
battleground, what will be the character of that 
competition?64 The United States and China seem 
to be furthest ahead in the development of AI. As 
the two most powerful countries in the world, the 
competition for global leadership in AI technology 
evokes, for many, 20th-century competitions such 
as the space race. Retired Marine Corps Gen. John 
Allen and SparkCognition CEO Amir Husain have 
argued that the United States therefore needs to do 
more to get and stay ahead.65
Global investments in artificial intelligence 
for economic and national security purposes 
are increasingly described as an arms race.66 
China published a national strategy on artificial 
intelligence in 2017 that said AI represents a “major 
strategic opportunity” and proposed a coordinated 
strategy to “build China’s first mover advantage” 
and lead the world in AI technology.67 Russia is 
investing heavily as well, especially in the military 
domain. Reports suggest that the Russian military 
is designing autonomous vehicles to guard its 
ballistic missile bases as well as an autonomous 
submarine that could carry nuclear weapons. In 
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robotics, Russia is deploying remotely piloted tanks, 
such as the Uran-9 and Vehar, on the battlefield.68
China and Russia are not the only actors outside 
the United States interested in national security 
applications of AI. The character of AI technology, 
like robotics, makes many countries well-positioned 
to design and deploy it for military purposes.69 
Commercial incentives for AI developments and 
the dual-use character of many AI applications 
mean that countries with advanced information 
economies are poised to be leaders in AI or at least 
fast followers.70 In Southeast Asia, Singapore is on 
the cutting edge of AI investments (both military 
and non-military). Other Southeast Asian nations 
are making advances in AI research as well.71 In 
the military domain, South Korea has developed 
the SGR-A1, a semi-autonomous weapon system 
designed to protect the demilitarized zone from 
attack by North Korea.72
AI also provides opportunities for capital-rich 
countries, which creates incentives to develop the 
technology. Wealthy, advanced economies that have 
high levels of capital but also have high labor costs 
or small populations — middle powers such as 
Australia, Canada, and many European countries — 
often face challenges in military recruiting. For these 
countries, technologies that allow them to substitute 
capital for labor are highly attractive. Indeed, Gen. 
Mick Ryan, commander of Australia’s Defence 
College, argues that countries can take advantage 
of the intersection of AI and robotics to overcome 
the problems caused by a small population.73 
France’s 2017 defense strategy review points to 
the development and incorporation of artificial 
intelligence as critical to the French military’s 
68  Samuel Bendett, “Russia Is Poised to Surprise the US in Battlefield Robotics,” Defense One, Jan. 25 2018, https://www.defenseone.com/
ideas/2018/01/russia-poised-surprise-us-battlefield-robotics/145439/; Barnes and Chin, “The New Arms Race in AI”; Samuel Bendett, “Red Robots 
Rising,” Strategy Bridge, Dec. 12, 2017, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/12/12/red-robots-rising-behind-the-rapid-development-of-
russian-unmanned-military-systems; Valerie Insinna, “Russia’s nuclear underwater drone is real and in the Nuclear Posture Review,” Defense News, 
Jan. 12, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/space/2018/01/12/russias-nuclear-underwater-drone-is-real-and-in-the-nuclear-posture-review/.
69  For an overview of AI and national security, see Daniel S. Hoadley and Nathan J. Lucas, “Artificial Intelligence and National Security,” 
Congressional Research Service, Apr. 26, 2018, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45178.pdf. Also see Benjamin Jensen, Chris Whyte, and Scott 
Cuomo, Algorithms at War: The Promise, Peril, and Limits of Artificial Intelligence, Working Paper (2018).
70  This is similar to what is going on in robotics. See Horowitz, “Military Robotics, Autonomous Systems, and the Future of Military Effectiveness.”
71  Sachin Chitturu et al., “Artificial Intelligence and Southeast Asia’s Future,” McKinsey Global Institute, September 2017, 1, https://www.mckinsey.
com/~/media/McKinsey/Global Themes/Artificial Intelligence/Artificial-intelligence-and-Southeast-Asias-future.ashx; Ng Eng Hen, “Speech at 
Committee of Supply Debate,” Ministry of Defense, Singapore, Mar. 7, 2014, https://www.mindef.gov.sg/web/portal/mindef/news-and-events/
latest-releases/article-detail/2014/march/2014mar06-speeches-00341/!ut/p/z0/fY07D4IwFIV_iwNjcy-IMKMOalQWNNjFVLxKFcqjDei_t8hq3M53c
h7AIQWuRCfvwshKicLyiQfnMF4uVuh7-3iWuBgdk2Q7m-_XhzCADfD_Abs.
72  Mark Prigg, “Who Goes There? Samsung Unveils Robot Sentry That Can Kill From Two Miles Away,” Daily Mail (UK), Sept. 15, 2014, http://www.
dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2756847/Who-goes-Samsung-reveals-robot-sentry-set-eye-North-Korea.html.
73  Ryan, “Building a Future: Integrated Human-Machine Military Organization.”
74  “Strategic Review of Defence and National Security: 2017,” French Ministry of Defense, Dec. 22, 2017, 3, https://www.defense.gouv.fr/dgris/
politique-de-defense/revue-strategique/revue-strategique. On the European approach to drones and AI, also see Franke, “A European Approach to 
Military Drones and Artificial Intelligence.”
75  Eliran Rubin, “Tiny IDF Unit Is Brains Behind Israeli Army Artificial Intelligence,” Haaretz, Aug. 15, 2017, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/
tiny-idf-unit-is-brains-behind-israeli-army-artificial-intelligence-1.5442911; Yaakov Lappin, “Artificial Intelligence Shapes the IDF in Ways Never 
Imagined,” Aglemeiner, Oct. 16, 2017, https://www.algemeiner.com/2017/10/16/artificial-intelligence-shapes-the-idf-in-ways-never-imagined/. 
76  Lappin, “Artificial Intelligence Shapes the IDF in Ways Never Imagined.”
ability to maintain “operational superiority.”74 
Israel, a classic example of an advanced economy 
with more capital than labor, also funds military AI 
investments that would predict rocket launches and 
analyze video footage.75 Lt. Col. Nurit Cohen Inger, 
who heads the unit of the Israeli Defense Forces 
(IDF) in charge of assessing the military relevance 
of AI, said in 2017 that, for the IDF, AI “can influence 
every step and small decision in a conflict, and the 
entire conflict itself.”76
Given these investments, how might 
developments in AI affect military organizations 
and the character of war, and how might they 
diffuse?
AI and the Character of War
The “character of warfare” in a period can be 
defined as the dominant way to fight and win 
conflicts given existing technologies, organizations, 
and polities. The character of warfare changes in 
concert with the tools that become available and 
how they influence the ways militaries organize 
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themselves to fight wars.77 The shift to mass 
mobilization in the Napoleonic era exemplifies a 
non-technological development that changed the 
character of warfare.
Applications of AI have the potential to shape 
how countries fight in several macro ways. On the 
broadest level, autonomous systems, or narrow 
AI systems, have the potential to increase the 
speed with which countries can fight, yet another 
similarity between AI and the combustion engine. 
Even if humans are still making final decisions 
about the use of lethal force, fighting at machine 
speed can dramatically increase the pace of 
operations.78
There are several military applications of AI 
currently in development or under discussion 
that can be considered, though many are at early 
stages. For example, some research shows that 
the way that neural networks can utilize imagery 
databases and classify particular scenes (such as a 
mountain), allows for a more accurate assessment 
of specific locations.79 Additionally, the processing 
power that is possible with narrow AI systems has 
the potential to increase the speed of data analysis, 
as Project Maven in the United States aims to do. 
Investments in image recognition offer the hope 
of achieving faster, more accurate results than 
humans can achieve today, and is a likely avenue 
for continued investment and application (setting 
aside the questions of accidents, hacking, and 
other ways that systems could go awry80). 
Successful implementation of AI beyond areas 
such as image recognition might lead to new 
concepts of operation that could influence force 
77  One could also argue AI has the potential to go beyond shaping the character of war and change the nature of war itself. From a Clausewitzian 
perspective, that war is human fundamentally defines its nature. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989). Thus, the nature of war is unchanging. In theory, could AI alter the nature of war itself because wars will 
be fought by robotic systems, not people, and because of AI’s potential to engage in planning and decision-making that were previously human 
endeavors? U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis speculated in February 2018 that AI is “fundamentally different” in ways that raise questions 
about the nature of war. See “Press Gaggle by Secretary Mattis En Route to Washington, D.C.,” Department of Defense, Feb. 17, 2018, https://
www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1444921/press-gaggle-by-secretary-mattis-en-route-to-washington-dc/. This is an 
important debate but one beyond the scope of this paper. For elements of this debate, see Kareem Ayoub and Kenneth Payne, “Strategy in the 
Age of Artificial Intelligence,” Journal of Strategic Studies 39, no. 5-6 (2016): 793-819, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1088838; Frank G. 
Hoffman, “Will War’s Nature Change in the Seventh Military Revolution?” Parameters 47, no. 4, (2018): 19-31, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/
parameters/issues/Winter_2017-18/5_Hoffman.pdf. Also see Kenneth Payne, Strategy, Evolution, and War: From Apes to Artificial Intelligence 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018).
78  Robert O. Work, Deputy Secretary of Defense Speech at Center for a New American Security Defense Forum, Dec. 14, 2015, http://www.
defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/634214/cnas-defense-forum; John R. Allen and Amir Husain, “On Hyperwar,” Proceedings of the 
United States Naval Institute 143, no. 7 (July 2017), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-07/hyperwar.
79  Bolei Zhou et al., “Places: A 10 Million Image Database for Scene Recognition,” IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence 
(July 2017), https://doi.org/10.1109/TPAMI.2017.2723009.
80  Miles Brundage et al., “The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention, and Mitigation,” Working Paper (2018), https://
arxiv.org/abs/1802.07228; Stephanie Carvin, “Normal Autonomous Accidents”, Social Science Research Network (2018), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.3161446.
81  For example, see Vijay Kumar, Aleksandr Kushleyev, and Daniel Mellinger, “Three-Dimensional Manipulation of Teams of Quadrotors,” Google 
Patents, 2017, https://patents.google.com/patent/US20150105946.
82  Simon Jones et al., “Evolving Behaviour Trees for Swarm Robotics,” in Distributed Autonomous Robotic Systems, ed. Roderich Grob, et al. 
(Boulder, CO: Springer, 2018).
83  Tero Karras et al., “Progressive Growing of GANs for Improved Quality, Stability, and Variation,” published as a conference paper at International 
Conference on Learning Representations 2018 (2018), https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.10196.
structure and force employment, or how militaries 
organize themselves and plan operations. One 
possibility is the use of large numbers of smaller 
platforms, known as swarms, for military operations. 
Algorithms and control systems designed to enable 
“swarming” already exist in the private sector and 
in academia.81 Military-grade algorithms would 
require coordination with other military systems, 
including early-warning aircraft, inhabited aircraft, 
satellites, and other sensors. Deployed swarms in 
a combat environment would have to be capable 
of real-time adaptation to optimize operations if 
some elements of the swarm were shot down — a 
challenge that commercial applications would not 
necessarily face. Methods for developing swarming 
algorithms could include behavior trees or deep 
learning.82
Another potential application for narrow AI that 
could shape the character of war is coordination 
through layers of algorithms that work together to 
help manage complex operations. These algorithms 
could be expert systems that generate decision 
trees. Or they could involve algorithms developed 
through generative adversarial networks. In this 
approach, algorithms compete against each other 
to teach each other how to do various tasks. Some 
algorithms will need to be trained to assist in 
coordinating multiple military assets, both human 
and machine. In that case, adversarial learning 
could help compensate for the unique character 
of decision-making in individual battles and the 
problem of learning to adapt beyond the available 
training data.83
The ability to operate faster through algorithms 
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that assist human commanders in optimizing 
battle plans, including real-time operations, could 
shift force employment and force structure, 
especially in the air and at sea. Since World War 
II, modern militaries have been engaged in a shift 
from quantity to quality in military systems. The 
thinking is that smaller numbers of expensive, 
high-quality systems are more likely to lead to 
victory in battles. AI could accelerate trends that 
challenge these long-running force-structure 
imperatives, such as the need to defeat adversaries 
with advanced anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD) 
networks with tolerable costs.
If algorithms and coordination at machine speed 
become critical to success on the battlefield, 
expensive, high-quality platforms could become 
vulnerable to swarms of sensors and lower-cost 
weapons platforms that are effectively networked 
together. AI could thus help bring quantity back 
into the equation in the form of large numbers of 
robotic systems. In the near to mid-term, however, 
optimal use of AI may lie in leveraging machine 
learning to improve the performance of existing 
platforms. 
Incentives exist for nearly all types of political 
regimes to develop AI applications for military 
purposes. For democracies, AI can decrease the 
relative burden of warfare on the population and 
reduce the risk to soldiers, even more so than with 
remotely piloted systems, by reducing the use of 
personnel. For autocracies, which do not trust their 
people in the first place, the ability to outsource 
some elements of military decision-making to 
algorithms, reducing reliance on humans to fight 
wars, is inherently attractive.84
Organizational Politics and Artificial 
Intelligence
Despite uncertainty about specific military 
applications of AI, the examples of how AI can 
be used in a military context described above 
reveal that these capabilities have the potential to 
significantly disrupt organizational structures. Take 
the example of battle management coordination 
(whether in human-machine teams or not): 
Successfully operating even semi-autonomous 
battle management systems is likely to require new 
occupational specialties and shifts in recruiting, 
training, and promotion to empower individuals 
84  Michael C. Horowitz, “The promise and peril of military applications of artificial intelligence,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Apr. 23, 2018, 
https://thebulletin.org/military-applications-artificial-intelligence/promise-and-peril-military-applications-artificial-intelligence. 
85  Rosen, Winning the Next War.
86  Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1997). This also relates to strategies for 
innovating within militaries. See Peter Dombrowski and Eugene Gholz, Buying Military Transformation (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).
87  Cummings, “Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare,” 9. Also see Lawrence Spinetta and Missy L. Cummings, “Unloved Aerial Vehicles: 
Gutting Its UAV Plan, the Air Force Sets a Course for Irrelevance,” Armed Forces Journal (November 2012): 8-12, http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/86940.
who understand both military operations and 
how particular AI systems function. Rosen shows 
that altering the promotion of military personnel 
to empower those with expertise in new areas is 
critical to adopting military innovations in general. 
AI should be no exception.85
As described above, the use of AI systems at the 
operational level could generate options for how 
militaries organize and plan to use force, due to 
the potential to use larger numbers of networked 
systems operating at machine speed instead of 
relying exclusively on small numbers of high-quality 
inhabited aircraft. Implementing such concepts, 
however, could require disruptive organizational 
shifts that could threaten to change which military 
occupations provide the highest status and are 
gateways to leadership roles. Already, this can be 
seen with the Air Force, dominated by fighter pilots, 
which has been relatively hesitant when it comes 
to investments in uninhabited aerial vehicles. It 
would also challenge entrenched bureaucratic 
notions about how to weigh quantity versus quality. 
Adopting narrow AI in the most optimal way could 
prove challenging for leading militaries, which will 
need trained personnel who can do quality and 
reliability assurance for AI applications to ensure 
their appropriate and effective use.
Other applications, such as Project Maven in the 
U.S. Department of Defense, are easier to implement 
because they are sustaining technologies from 
the perspective of literature on organizational 
innovation.86 Autonomous systems that can rapidly 
and accurately process drone footage do not disrupt 
high-status military occupational specialties, nor 
do they disrupt how military services operate 
as a whole. It is when optimal uses of narrow AI 
would require large shifts to force structure that 
the adoption requirements, and bureaucratic anti-
bodies, ramp up. One example of bureaucratic 
resistance preventing the production of a new 
technology that could have proved disruptive is 
the U.S. military’s failure to fund the X-47B drone, 
a next-generation system that could take off 
from and land on aircraft carriers autonomously. 
This illustrates the way bureaucratic politics and 
organizational competition can hinder the adoption 
of innovative technologies.87
The strategic or organizational culture of a 
military or society can also indicate which will be 
best positioned to exploit potential advances in 
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AI,88 specifically, how open those cultures are to 
innovation. There is a risk of tautology, of course, 
in cultural arguments at times since it can be hard 
to measure whether an organization is capable of 
adopting a technology until it has tried to do so 
or done it. However, Emily Goldman’s work on the 
Ottoman Empire suggests the value of developing 
metrics of cultural openness when it comes to 
predicting willingness to experiment and adopt AI 
systems.89 
Interestingly, norms regarding force structure 
could also play a role in inhibiting the use of AI for 
certain military tasks. As Theo Farrell’s research 
on the Irish Army after independence shows, 
militaries often mimic the functional form of more 
powerful actors even when doing so is not in 
their interest. Applying his insight in the case of 
artificial intelligence, some militaries may be less 
likely to use AI in ways that are organizationally 
disruptive, especially if doing so would involve 
shifts in visible force structure, such as a move 
from small numbers of advanced inhabited aircraft 
to swarming concepts that use cheaper, more 
disposable aircraft.90
Arguments about organizational and strategic 
culture are generally consistent with adoption 
capacity theory, since both focus on the challenges 
that innovations present when they disrupt the 
identity of an organization.91 After all, militaries that 
already spend a lot on research and development, 
that are younger, and that have broad conceptions 
of their critical task are more likely to be culturally 
“open” and able to adopt new technologies or full 
innovations further down the development line.
88  Adamsky, Culture of Military Innovation. 
89  Emily O. Goldman, “Cultural Foundations of Military Diffusion,” Review of International Studies 32, no. 1 (2006): 69-91, https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0260210506006930.
90  Farrell, “World Culture and Military Power.”
91  Horowitz, Diffusion of Military Power.
92  Horowitz, Diffusion of Military Power.
93  Tim Hwang, “Computational Power and the Social Impact of Artificial Intelligence,” Mar. 23, 2018, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3147971.
94  Hof, “Deep Learning.”
The Diffusion of Militarily-Relevant AI: 
Two Scenarios
There is a fundamental question about the 
extent to which militarily-relevant uses of narrow 
AI will diffuse easily. Answering this question is 
necessary for predicting the first-mover advantages 
associated with a technological innovation, which 
in turn helps to determine its relative impact on 
the balance of power and warfare. To determine 
how easily a new technology will diffuse, adoption 
capacity theory suggests looking at the unit cost 
of the technology, especially the physical hardware.
Designing AI capabilities requires both software 
and hardware. This influences how to think about 
the “unit cost” of AI. Military capabilities based 
in hardware often spread more slowly than those 
based in software, generating more sustainable 
advantage for the first adopter of a given capability, 
especially when the unit costs of that capability are 
relatively high. The high unit cost of flattop aircraft 
carriers, for example, means that only wealthy and 
powerful countries adopt them.92
When it comes to platforms, algorithms are 
software rather than hardware. Take the example 
of the MQ-9 Reaper, a current-generation U.S. 
military armed drone. The MQ-9 is remotely piloted, 
meaning that a pilot at another location directs the 
airframe and makes decisions about firing weapons 
against potential targets. The difference between 
this and an autonomous version that is piloted and 
operated by an algorithm is software. From the 
outside, the platform would look the same.
But, if narrow AI is software from the perspective 
of military technology, it is software that 
requires substantial hardware for its creation. 
The associated hardware costs — especially for 
advanced narrow AI applications — are potentially 
significant.93 The more complex the algorithm, the 
more up-front computational hardware is required 
to “train” that algorithm.94 Thus, corporate and 
academic AI research leaders have to invest in 
teraflops of computing power. This is a different 
kind of hardware than a tank or a cruise missile, 
but it is hardware all the same. Rapid advances 
in AI through deep learning and neural networks 
over the last decade have thus required advances 
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in computing hardware. Joel Emer, an electrical 
engineering and computer science professor at 
MIT, states it plainly: “Many AI accomplishments 
were made possible because of advances in 
hardware.”95 After an algorithm has been trained, 
however, it can be applied without access to that 
computing environment, and the power necessary 
to run completed algorithms is dramatically 
reduced.
How rapidly AI capabilities will diffuse via 
simultaneous invention or mimicry will depend, 
in part, on the availability of computing power. If 
the cost of computing power continues to decline 
as chips become more efficient, then countries 
that are already home to advanced technology 
companies will have more access to AI capabilities 
faster than other countries without those kinds of 
technology companies.
If, on the other hand, the hardware costs of 
developing complex algorithms remain beyond the 
capacity of companies in most countries, diffusion 
will happen only deliberately, such as through trade 
or bilateral agreements at the nation-state level, or 
via espionage (i.e., hacking). This would likely slow 
the diffusion of most AI advances, increasing the 
advantages for innovators. 
Determining the extent to which militarily-
relevant applications of AI are based on commercial 
technology versus exclusively military research is 
also a critical question raised by adoption capacity 
95  Meg Murphy, “Building the Hardware for the Next Generation of Artificial Intelligence,” MIT News, Nov. 30 2017, http://news.mit.edu/2017/
building-hardware-next-generation-artificial-intelligence-1201.
96  James Manyika et al., “What the Future of Work Will Mean for Jobs, Skills, and Wages,” McKinsey Global Institute report, November 2017, 
https://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/future-of-organizations-and-work/what-the-future-of-work-will-mean-for-jobs-skills-and-wages.
97  Carl B. Frey and Michael A. Osborne, “The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation?” Technological Forecasting 
and Social Change 114 (January 2017): 254-280, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.08.019. 
98  Cummings, “Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare”: 10. 
99  Kate Conger and Dell Cameron, “Google Is Helping the Pentagon Build AI for Drones,” Gizmodo, Mar. 6, 2018, https://gizmodo.com/google-is-
helping-the-pentagon-build-ai-for-drones-1823464533.
100  Horowitz, Diffusion of Military Power.
theory. While it is hard to know the answer at 
present, examining both scenarios will illustrate 
how that answer might shape the way AI affects the 
balance of power and the structure of international 
competition.
Dual-Use AI
Research on the future of work suggests that 
strong commercial drivers are incentivizing 
the development of AI around the world. A 2017 
McKinsey Global Institute report found a midpoint 
estimate of 400 million people, or 15 percent of 
the workforce, that are likely to be 
disrupted by automation before 
2030.96 Widely cited research by 
Carl B. Frey and Michael A. Osborne 
estimates that 47 percent of jobs in 
the United States are at risk of being 
replaced by automation. That includes 
lawyers, stock traders, and accountants, 
not just blue-collar jobs.97 Companies across 
the economy have incentives to develop and 
use algorithms. 
Commercial interest in AI is so high that 
some argue it — and the finite number of 
talented AI engineers — is holding back military 
developments.98 What’s more, the higher salaries 
and benefits that commercial companies can offer 
mean that militaries may have to turn to civilian 
companies to develop advanced AI capabilities. 
Google’s decision to partner with the U.S. Defense 
Department on Project Maven illustrates how 
the same talent and knowledge that will drive 
commercial innovation in AI may also be necessary 
for military technology innovation.99
When technology advances derive primarily 
from the civilian sector, rapid adoption of new 
technologies around the world becomes more likely. 
Commercial companies may spread the technology 
themselves, and the profit motive incentivizes 
rapid mimicry by related companies in different 
countries.100 Companies in Brazil, Germany, Japan, 
and Singapore could become AI leaders or at least 
fast followers.
A commitment to open-source development by 
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many of the major players in AI could also increase 
the rate of diffusion. In 2015, for example, Google 
opened up TensorFlow, its artificial intelligence 
engine, to the public.101 Elsewhere, researchers 
committed to the open development of AI to help 
reduce the safety risk of algorithms that “break” 
in high-leverage situations publish their findings in 
ways that advance their cause — and make it easier 
for their algorithms to be copied.102
Even though advanced applications of 
commercial AI would require significant hardware 
and expertise, adoption capacity theory suggests 
that as the underlying basis of a technology 
gets more commercially oriented, it spreads 
relatively faster, as explained above. Companies 
like DeepMind have an edge today. But in such a 
scenario, there would be more companies around 
the world with relevant technological capacity. It 
is also easier for governments to leverage private-
sector companies when those private-sector actors 
have non-governmental market incentives for 
developing or copying technology. 
So how would dual-use AI being critical to 
military applications of AI shape global power? As 
noted above, the period in which a technological 
innovator enjoys a market advantage shrinks when 
countries and companies can acquire or copy 
others’ advances relatively easily. This makes it hard 
to stay ahead qualitatively.103 In the AI and robotics 
realms, it is possible that this will create yet another 
incentive for countries to focus on quantity in 
military systems. If leads in AI development prove 
difficult to sustain, advanced militaries are likely 
to have systems of approximately the same quality 
level, presuming they all reach the same conclusion 
about the general potential of integrating AI into 
military operations. In that case, countries may be 
more likely to try to gain advantage by emphasizing 
quantity again — this is in addition to the inherent 
incentives for mass that narrow AI might create.
If dual-use AI is critical to military applications 
of AI, the ability to design forces, training, and 
operational plans to take advantage of those dual-
use applications will be a differentiating factor for 
leadership in AI among the great powers. The 1940 
Battle of France illustrates what could ultimately 
101  Cade Metz, “Google Just Open Sourced TensorFlow, Its Artificial Intelligence Engine,” Wired, Nov. 9, 2015, https://www.wired.com/2015/11/
google-open-sources-its-artificial-intelligence-engine/.
102  Dario Amodei et al., “Concrete Problems in AI Safety,” arXiv, July 25, 2016, https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.06565. This commitment to openness 
has limits. Google has many proprietary algorithms, and Microsoft’s Watson (which first came to fame when it defeated Ken Jennings, the greatest 
living human Jeopardy player) is also proprietary. 
103  In extreme examples where first-mover advantages are difficult to generate, there can be advantages for rapid followers that do not have 
to pay initial R&D costs. Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1962).
104  The Germans did not call it blitzkrieg, explicitly. Ernest R. May, Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000); 
Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine.
be at stake in the most extreme case. Both the 
Germans on one side and the British and French on 
the other had tanks, trucks, radios, and airplanes 
that they could, in theory, have used for close 
air support. What gave the Germans such a large 
edge was blitzkrieg — a new concept of operations 
that could overwhelm even another advanced 
adversary.104
Let’s return to the comparison between AI and 
the space race. If AI technology diffuses more 
rapidly because it has both commercial and 
military purposes, making first-mover advantages 
more difficult to sustain, comparisons to the 
space race may be limited. The space race was a 
bilateral challenge between the United States and 
the Soviet Union designed to put a person on 
the moon, which included both developments in 
rockets and technologies designed to keep humans 
alive in space, land on the moon, and return safely. 
The rocket development itself was also part of 
the creation of intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs). And critical economic spillovers from the 
space race included development of the satellites 
that led to GPS and other key enablers of the 
Information Age. Yet overall, the race to the moon 
was run by two governments for national purposes 
— not primarily for dual-use economic gain. 
The commercial drivers of AI technology, and 
the speed with which new algorithms diffuse, 
would make competition much broader than it 
was during the bilateral space race. Competition 
is much more likely to be multilateral, featuring 
countries and companies around the world. 
A better analogy might be to the competition 
surrounding the development of Second Industrial 
Revolution technologies in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries. France, Germany, Britain, Japan, 
the United States, and others vied for supremacy in 
steel production, chemicals, petroleum, electricity, 
and other areas.
For military applications of AI where the 
underlying technology is driven by commercial 
developments, the impact of a country getting 
ahead in AI technology, over time, would have 
unclear implications for relative power if a rival 
country was close enough to be a fast follower. 
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Advances in commercially driven AI technology 
are about building new industries, changing the 
character of existing industries, and ensuring that 
the leading corporations in the global economy 
that emerges are based in one’s own country. 
Militarily-Exclusive AI
The alternative to military applications of AI that 
are based in commercial developments is a world 
where military applications of AI are driven instead 
by research that is applicable only to militaries. 
Copying technological innovations of “excludable” 
technologies — those not based on widely available 
commercial technology — requires espionage to 
steal the technology (as the Soviets did with the 
atomic bomb) or mimicry based on observable 
principles of the technology.105 There are several 
reasons, however, to think that many military 
applications of narrow AI will be unique in ways 
that will make them more difficult to copy. 
First, the complexity of advanced military systems 
can make emulation costly and difficult. This is 
especially true when a number of components are 
not available on the commercial market and the 
ability to build them depends, in part, on classified 
information.106 The same can also be said for 
some advanced commercial technology, of course, 
but this is not the norm. The inability to adapt 
commercial algorithms for some military purposes 
could limit the capacity of most states to produce 
relevant AI-based military capabilities, even if they 
have advanced commercial AI sectors. It could also 
mean that systems integration challenges for using 
105  The issue of algorithm theft raises questions of cybersecurity. This differs from more common questions about whether cyberweapons are 
autonomous weapons. On cyber in general, see Thomas Rid, Rise of the Machines: A Cybernetic History (New York: W. W. Norton, 2016); Rebecca 
Slayton, “What Is the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance? Conceptions, Causes, and Assessment,” International Security 41, no. 3 (2017): 72-109, 
https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00267; Ben Buchanan, The Cybersecurity Dilemma: Hacking, Trust, and Fear Between Nations (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017); Nina Kollars, “The Rise of Smart Machines,” in The Palgrave Handbook of Security, Risk, and Intelligence, ed. Robert Dover, 
Huw Dylan, and Michael Goodmans (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016), 195-211.
106  Stephen G. Brooks, Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus of Conflict (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2005); Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli, “The Diffusion of Drone Warfare? Industrial, Organizational and Infrastructural 
Constraints,” Security Studies 25, no. 1 (2016): 50-84, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2016.1134189.
107  Gilli and Gilli, “Military-Technological Superiority.” Note this extends the argument to AI. 
militarily-relevant algorithms are large enough to 
deter many militaries from investing heavily.107
Whatever the uncertainty about how specific AI 
advances will translate into military capabilities, 
some of the most important military applications 
of narrow AI — those with a potentially substantial 
impact on larger-scale military operations — may 
not have obvious civilian counterparts. Battle 
management algorithms that coordinate a military 
operation at machine speed do not necessarily 
have commercial analogues — even if supervised 
by a human with command authority — excluding 
the development of a narrow AI designed, say, to 
run a factory or operational system from top to 
bottom. In these arenas, military-grade algorithms 
may require conceptual breakthroughs that other 
countries may find hard to rapidly mimic.
Second, some military AI 
applications , such as image 
recognition, do have obvious 
commercial counterparts. 
Even in those cases, however, 
the cybersecurity concerns 
and reliability associated with 
military-grade technology can 
differ from those for civilian 
applications. Military AI systems 
deployed in the field may require 
hardening for electronic warfare 
and extra protections from 
spoofing and hacking that would be of relatively 
less concern in the civilian world. In military 
environments, adversaries’ efforts to hack and 
spoof increase the need for security.
The potential for countries to have strong 
commercial AI research sectors may mean that 
even narrow AI developments with applications 
geared toward military use may be easier to mimic 
than, say, stealth technology has been over the last 
generation. But stealth is an outlier: It has proven 
uniquely difficult to copy relative to other military 
technologies over the past few hundred years. 
For AI developments that do not have clear 
commercial analogues, there could be substantial 
first-mover advantages for militaries that swiftly 
adopt AI technologies, particularly if they can 
achieve compute-driven breakthroughs that 
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are difficult to copy. What would this mean for 
AI competition? As described above, China’s 
AI strategy highlights the way many countries 
increasingly view AI as a global competition that 
involves nation-states, rather than as a market 
in which companies can invest.108 As Elsa Kania 
writes, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
is funding a wide range of projects involving 
AI, and the Chinese defense industry and PLA 
research institutes are pursuing extensive 
research and development, in some cases 
partnering with private enterprises.109
Adopting militarily-exclusive AI technologies 
could also generate significant organizational 
pressure on militaries. Even if it would be hard 
for most countries to be fast followers, or mimic 
the advances of other militaries, great-power 
competition in AI would generate risk for those 
powers that are unable to adapt in order to 
108  Elsa B. Kania, “Battlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China’s Future Military Power,” Center for a New American 
Security, Nov. 28, 2017, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/battlefield-singularity-artificial-intelligence-military-revolution-and-chinas-
future-military-power.
109  Kania, “Battlefield Singularity”: 4. .
110  Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics.
organizationally exploit advances in AI, even 
if they are able to make technical advances. 
Traditionally, this risk is highest for the world’s 
leading military power, in this case the United 
States. Leading military powers often struggle to 
envision how to use new technologies in ways that 
are organizationally disruptive. They can also be 
blind to that fact, believing they are in the lead 
right up to the point when their failure of creativity 
matters.110
From a balance-of-power perspective, this 
scenario would be more likely to feature disruption 
among emerging and great powers but not a broader 
leveling of the military playing field. The ability to 
exclude many countries from advances in AI would 
concentrate military competition among current 
leading militaries, such as the United States, China, 
and Russia. There could be significant disruption 
within those categories, though. A Chinese military 
that more rapidly developed critical algorithms 
for broader battle management, or that was more 
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willing to use them than the United States, might 
gain advantages that shifted power in the Asia-
Pacific. This assumes that these algorithms operate 
as they are designed to operate. All militarily-useful 
AI will have to be hardened against hacking and 
spoofing. Operators will use narrow AI applications 
only if they are as or more effective or reliable as 
existing inhabited or remotely-piloted options.111
While this discussion has focused on narrow AI 
applications, the notion of bilateral competition 
in AI may be most pressing when thinking about 
artificial general intelligence.112 Although artificial 
general intelligence is beyond the scope of this 
paper, it would matter as a discrete competitive 
point only if there is a clear reward to being first, 
as opposed to being a fast follower. For example, 
developing artificial general intelligence first 
could lock in economic or military leadership. 
Then others would not have the ability to adopt it 
themselves, or their adoptions would be somehow 
less relevant, and that could be a discrete “end 
point” to competition. It seems unlikely, however, 
that such development would be that discrete or 
that one country would get a lead in this technology 
that is so large that it can consolidate the impact of 
being a first mover before others catch up.
Conclusion
Technological innovations, whether the machine 
gun, the railroad, or the longbow, can influence the 
balance of power and international conflict. Yet 
their impact is generally determined by how people 
and organizations use the technology rather than 
111  Paul Scharre, “Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk,” Center for a New American Security, working paper, (February 2016), https://www.
cnas.org/publications/reports/autonomous-weapons-and-operational-risk.
112  Thanks to Heather Roff for making this point clear.
113  H.R. McMaster, “Continuity and Change: The Army Operating Concept and Clear Thinking About Future War.”
by the technology itself.113 It is too early to tell what 
the impact of narrow AI will be, but technology 
development suggests it will have at least some 
effect.
As an “enabling” technology that is more 
like electricity or the combustion engine than 
a weapon system, narrow AI is likely to have an 
impact that extends beyond specific questions of 
military superiority to influence economic power 
and societies around the world. This article 
demonstrates that technological innovation in 
AI could have large-scale consequences for the 
global balance of power. Whatever the mix of 
dual-use AI or militarily-exclusive AI that ends 
up shaping modern militaries over the next few 
decades, the organizational adoption requirements 
are likely to be significant. Militaries around the 
world will have to grapple with how to change 
recruiting and promotion policies to empower 
soldiers who understand algorithms and coding, 
as well as potential shifts in force structure to 





suggests that the effect 
of narrow AI could 
be quite large, even if 
suggestions of AI triggering 
a new industrial revolution 
are overstated. Adoption 
capacity theory shows that 
changes in relative military 
power become more likely in 
cases of military innovations that 
require large organizational changes 
and the adoption of new operational concepts. 
Even if the United States, China, and Russia were to 
end up with similar levels of basic AI capacity over 
the next decade, the history of military innovations 
from the phalanx to blitzkrieg suggests it is how 
they and others use AI that will matter most for the 
future of military power.
Whether AI capabilities diffuse relatively slowly 
or quickly, major military powers will likely 
face security dilemmas having to do with AI 
development and deployment. In a slow diffusion 
scenario, if countries fear that adversaries could 
get ahead in ways that are hard to rapidly mimic 
— and small differences in capabilities will matter 
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on the battlefield — that will foster incentives for 
quick development and deployment. In a rapid 
diffusion scenario, competitive incentives will also 
exist, as countries feel like they have to race just to 
keep up.114 Moreover, it will be inherently difficult 
to measure competitors’ progress with AI (unlike, 
say, observing the construction of an aircraft 
carrier), causing countries to assume the worst of 
their potential rivals.
Competition in developing AI is underway. 
Countries around the world are investing heavily 
in AI, though the United States and China seem 
to be ahead. Yet even if the space-race analogy is 
not precise, understanding AI as a competition 
can still be useful. Such frameworks help people 
and organizations understand the world around 
them, from how to evaluate international threats 
to the potential trajectory of wars.115 If likening 
competition in AI to the space race clarifies 
the stakes in ways that generate incentives for 
bureaucratic action at the government level, and 
raises corporate and public awareness, the analogy 
stands to have utility for the United States.
From a research perspective, one limitation of 
this article is its focus on the balance of power 
and international competition, as opposed 
to specific uses of AI. Future research could 
investigate particular implementations of AI for 
military purposes or other critical questions. 
Specific implementations could include the use of 
autonomous weapon systems able to select and 
engage targets on their own. These systems could 
raise ethical and moral questions about human 
control,116 as well as practical issues surrounding 
war that is fought at “machine speed.”117 The 
integration of AI into early-warning systems 
and its ability to aid in rapid targeting could also 
114  On the security dilemma, see Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 167-214, http://www.
jstor.org/stable/2009958. This would also make arms control more difficult.
115  Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1992).
116  Michael C. Horowitz, “The Ethics and Morality of Robotic Warfare: Assessing The Debate Over Autonomous Weapons,” Daedalus 145, no. 4 
(2016): 25-36, https://doi.org/10.1162/DAED_a_00409.
117  On warfare at machine speed, see Robert O. Work, Deputy Secretary of Defense Remarks to the Association of the U.S. Army Annual 
Convention, Oct. 4, 2016, https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/974075/remarks-to-the-association-of-the-us-army-
annual-convention/. On AI and the speed of war, see Allen and Husain, “On Hyperwar.”
118  Horowitz, Scharre, and Velez-Green, “A Stable Nuclear Future?”
119  Heather Roff, “Advancing Human Security Through Artificial Intelligence,” Chatham House, May 2017, https://www.chathamhouse.org/
publication/advancing-human-security-through-artificial-intelligence.
120  Ed Felten and Terah Lyons, “The Administration’s Report on the Future of Artificial Intelligence,” White House, Oct. 12, 2016, https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/10/12/administrations-report-future-artificial-intelligence.
121  Aaron Boyd, “White House Announces Select Committee of Federal AI Experts,” Nextgov, May 10, 2018, https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-
tech/2018/05/white-house-announces-select-committee-federal-ai-experts/148123/. 
122  For a recent example, see William A. Carter, Emma Kinnucan, and Josh Elliot, “A National Machine Intelligence Strategy for the United States,” 
Center for Strategic and International Studies and Booz Allen Hamilton, March 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/national-machine-intelligence-
strategy-united-states.
123  Allen and Husain, “The Next Space Race Is Artificial Intelligence.”
affect crisis stability and nuclear weapons.118 In 
the broader security realm, AI will affect human 
security missions.119 By laying out an initial 
framework for how military applications of narrow 
AI could structure international competition 
and the balance of power, this article lays the 
groundwork for thinking through these questions 
in the future.
This article also raises a series of policy 
questions. When thinking about AI as an arena for 
international competition, one question is whether, 
in response to China’s AI strategy, the United States 
should launch its own comprehensive AI strategy. 
In 2016, the Obama White House released an AI 
policy road map. It acknowledged the importance 
of U.S. leadership in AI but focused mostly on 
regulatory policy questions.120 The transition from 
Barack Obama to Donald Trump led to a pause in 
these efforts, though the White House recently 
announced the creation of a new committee of AI 
experts to advise it on policy choices.121 
Some might argue that it is necessary for the 
United States to develop and announce a formal AI 
strategy similar to China’s.122 While there are plenty 
of private-sector incentives for the development of 
AI technology, only the government can coordinate 
AI investments and ensure the development of 
particular implementations that it considers critical 
for AI leadership.123
On the other hand, it is the free market in the 
United States, and its connections to the global 
economy, that have made the United States an 
engine of global innovation. More centrally planned 
economies have often struggled with innovation. 
During the Cold War, the Soviet defense industrial 
base and military proved effective at perfecting 
existing technologies or adopting technologies. 
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The centralized Soviet system, however, made true 
innovation more difficult.124 
China is spending much more than the United 
States on AI research, and Chinese AI researchers 
are producing more papers on topics such as deep 
learning than U.S. researchers.125 How that translates 
into tangible advances in AI technology is unclear. 
From a balance-of-power perspective, one could 
argue that the optimal approach would involve a 
mixed strategy between market and government 
development of AI. In the economic arena, central 
planning can stifle innovation, meaning the role of 
government should be to fund basic research and 
then let market incentives do the rest. 
The defense sector may be different, however. For 
the United States, it will be up to the Department 
of Defense to clearly outline what types of AI 
technologies are most useful and to seed research 
and development to turn those technologies into a 
reality. For any strategy, for both the United States 
and China, a principal challenge will be translating 
basic research in programs of record into actual 
capabilities. As Cummings writes about government 
agencies working on AI systems around the world, 
“[T]he agencies developing these technologies are 
struggling to make the leap from development to 
operational implementation.”126
More broadly, if investing in and appropriately 
utilizing AI is critical to military power in the 21st 
century, the U.S. approach is a mixed bag. Optimists 
can point to investments in connecting cutting-
edge research to U.S. military forces through 
institutions such as the Defense Innovation Unit 
– Experimental (DIUx), the Strategic Capabilities 
Office, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA). From discussions of the “Third 
Offset” to “Multi-Domain Battle,” senior military 
and civilian leaders are also taking the challenge of 
AI seriously.127 
Meanwhile, a great deal of bottom-up innovation 
is happening in the U.S. military, both in terms of 
developing technologies and experimenting with 
124  Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1988).
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novel concepts of operation. It is possible that the 
research and smaller, experimental programs that 
the United States is funding will become part of 
mainstream U.S. military programs, enabling the 
United States to stay ahead and sustain its military 
superiority. If narrow AI continues to develop, 
adopting the technology will require sustained 
attention by senior leaders. 
Pessimists, however, can point to a gap between 
rhetoric and unit-level experimentation on the 
one hand and budgetary realities on the other.128 
There is a lot of discussion about the importance of 
artificial intelligence and robotics, as well as a clear 
desire among senior uniformed leadership to make 
the U.S. military more networked, distributed, 
and lethal by taking advantage of AI, among other 
technologies.129 This rhetoric has not yet caught 
up to reality in terms of U.S. military spending 
on AI. When faced with a choice of investing in 
a next-generation drone, for example, the U.S. 
Navy used its available programmatic dollars for 
the MQ-25 air-to-air refueling platform, which will 
support inhabited aircraft such as the F-35. The 
MQ-25 program was chosen over an advanced 
armed system — based on the X-47B demonstrator 
— with stealthy potential that could operate in 
dangerous conflict environments.130 The MQ-25 
decision may be seen as the canary in the coal 
mine if the U.S. military falls behind in the coming 
decades — especially if a failure to appropriately 
adopt advances in AI and robotics turns out to be a 
key reason for that relative military decline.
At the end of the day, however, AI’s effect on 
international politics will depend on much more 
than choices about one particular military program. 
The challenge for the United States will be in 
calibrating, based on trends in AI developments, 
how fast to move in incorporating narrow AI 
applications. This will be true whether those 
applications are dual-use or based in exclusively-
military research. And that challenge to leadership 
in AI in general, as well as in military power, 
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is complicated by the movements of China 
and other competitors, all of which seem interested 
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